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ABSTRACT
Modern cars include a vast array of computer systems designed to
remove the burden on drivers and enhance safety. As cars are evolv-
ing towards autonomy and taking over control, e.g. in the form of
autopilots, it becomes harder for drivers to pinpoint the root causes
of a car’s malfunctioning. Drivers may need additional informa-
tion to assess these ambiguous situations correctly. However, it is
yet unclear which information is relevant and helpful to drivers
in such situations. Hence, we conducted a mixed-methods online
survey (𝑁 = 60) on Amazon MTurk where we exposed participants
to two security- and safety-critical situations with one of three
different explanations. We applied Thematic and Correspondence
Analysis to understand which factors in these situations moderate
drivers’ information demand. We identified a fundamental infor-
mation demand across scenarios that is expanded by error-specific
information types. Moreover, we found that it is necessary to com-
municate error sources, since drivers might not be able to identify
them correctly otherwise. Thereby, malicious intrusions are typi-
cally perceived as more critical than technical malfunctions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, modern cars’ automation levels increased from dri-
ver assistance to partial automation – therebymaking car-integrated
technology unprecedentedly complex. These cars increase driving
safety while also reducing the burden on drivers. To date, modern
automation features require constant supervision which drivers
struggle to provide over a longer period of time [36]. However, even
if they do pay attention, the reactions of the car may be hard to
predict or explain, e.g. in case of an accident. In older cars, the blame
was usually on the driver or some technical malfunction. Modern
cars’ behavior is becoming increasingly opaque due to a rising level
of autonomy, while opening up new attack surfaces [2, 48, 55, 65–
67], and exposing drivers to unknown threats. Hence, drivers in-
creasingly rely on proper in-car risk communication. If drivers
would receive relevant information they could: (1) explain the car’s
behavior, which also builds trust and confidence in the technology,
(2) resolve liability issues, i.e., blame the correct party for the ac-
cident, and (3) take appropriate actions to avoid such accidents in
the future.
However, to provide drivers with helpful explanations and warn-
ings, we first need to understand the drivers’ information demand
in safety- and security-critical incidents. The impact and design of
explanations and warnings have been extensively studied with re-
spect to security warnings in browsers [1, 40, 41, 51–53]. However,
the domain of partially-autonomous vehicles constitutes a special
case, as it involves potentially life-threatening situations. Lim and
Dey investigated the demand for intelligibility in context-aware
applications [42]. However, they focused on desktop applications
and explicitly did not cover any level of autonomy or high risk
situations. Recent work of Smith et al. focused on high risk situ-
ations. The authors explored pilot reactions to attacks on avionic
systems [59]. However, their emphasis was more on reactions and
not on information demand in security critical situations.
To investigate drivers’ information demand, we conducted a
mixed-methods online survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk with
𝑁 = 60 participants. At this point we want to distinguish the “dri-
vers” in our study from real-world drivers. That is, in our study
participants react to hypothetical scenarios relieving them from
any driving-related tasks. We exposed participants to safety- and
security-critical situations. We carefully selected ambiguous mal-
functions for these situations which could be explained by either a
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malicious intrusion or a technical defect: (1) a car with activated au-
topilot hits construction barrels on the highway, and (2) a car does
not unlock upon the first click of the key. The survey provided one
of the following explanations for these situations: (a) a malicious
intrusion (security breach), (b) a technical malfunction, or (c) no ex-
planation. Exposing participants to different explanations expands
the exploratory space, as the context of the critical situations shifts
according to the car’s explanations. Adding a condition in which
the car does not provide an explanation gives us insights about the
participants’ own interpretation of the error cause.
Afterward, we used open-ended questions to elicit the partic-
ipants’ information demand and quantitative questions to assess
their trust, satisfaction, and operational intent. We used Thematic
Analysis [4] to evaluate the qualitative data. Additionally, we ap-
plied Correspondence Analysis [16] to understand which factors in
these safety- and security-critical situations moderate drivers’ infor-
mation demand. The quantitative data was analyzed with statistical
tests to verify qualitative results.
We found a basic need for information across scenarios, which is
expanded depending on perceived error causes. Technical malfunc-
tions and malicious intrusions have little overlap resulting in more
car or situation specific information demand. Malicious intrusions
were consistently perceived as critical, even if other perceived error
sources in the same scenario were not. There exists a gap between
highly critical situations and less critical situations in terms of trust,
satisfaction, and operational intent ratings. Additionally, we identi-
fied the need to communicate error sources, as participants are not
aware of malicious intrusions. They also have trouble to assess and
react to highly critical situations.
2 RELATEDWORK
In the following, we discuss related work on intelligibility in human-
computer interaction, trust and explainability in autonomous sys-
tems.
Intelligibility in Human-Computer Interaction
Our work is heavily influenced by Lim and Dey’s paper “Assessing
Demand for Intelligibility in Context Aware Applications” [40]. The
authors conducted two experiments to elicit users’ demand for in-
formation and to verify their findings. The first experiment was an
online study carried out on Amazon Mechanical Turk [63]. Partici-
pants had to answer qualitative questions regarding the behavior of
one of four context-aware applications. Additionally, Lim and Dey
assessed participants’ satisfaction ratings regarding their experi-
ence with the application. The second experiment assessed whether
or not users’ satisfaction levels rise if they are presented with the
type of information they demand. The authors found, among other
things, that users want any available information in critical situ-
ations, while at the same time they are hardly satisfied with the
information they get. The authors, however, did not include au-
tonomous vehicles or systems of any kind in their study. In the
following year, Lim and Dey published a toolkit to support intelligi-
bility in context-aware applications [41]. The toolkit was designed
to assist developers with incorporating different intelligibility types
into applications. However, since the context of driving a car is
inherently different from using a desktop application, further work
is necessary to investigate this specific use case and technology.
Our study aims to close this gap in the literature. Bellotti et al. came
up with four principles to support intelligibility and accountability
in context-aware systems [3]. They identified a need to inform the
user of a system’s capabilities, provide feedback, ensure identity
and action disclosure, and grant the user control over the system.
While these principles are an excellent point of reference, their
broad character does not allow for concrete design decisions. Our
study provides actionable insights that help to improve car-driver
communication in line with these principles. Research has also ad-
dressed the information needs of users in other areas. For example,
McGuinness et al. conducted an interview study that identified
themes influencing the willingness of users to use and trust an
adaptive agent [15, 44]. In addition, Gregor et al. did a meta-review
and identified what kind of explanations users of knowledge-based
systems demand [25]. Jakobi et al. investigated long-term informa-
tion demands in do-it-yourself smart home systems, identifying
changing information demands over time [30]. Again, the results of
these works cannot be directly transferred to the domain of modern
cars. Therefore, our study will provide valuable contributions to
complete the picture of the information needs of users in different
contexts.
Explainable Artificial Intelligence in
Autonomous Systems
Recent research focused on making the actions and internal pro-
cesses of systems with varying levels of autonomy understandable,
and communicating them to users [9, 27, 29, 32, 38, 56]. For instance,
Hastie et al. [27] introduced a multimodal interface (MIRIAM) for
remote autonomous systems. MIRIAM is intended to increase the
transparency of the system and thus strengthen the operator’s con-
fidence in the system. The interface allows one to pose why and
what questions to the system. Langley et al. [38] framed the concept
of explainable agency for intelligent autonomous systems and claim
that an agent needs to convey its internal reasoning to the user, and
which actions it executed, among other things. These approaches
form a good basis when it comes to conveying knowledge to users.
However, depending on the situation, the drivers may not be re-
ceptive to different types of information. Therefore, it is important
to investigate the information needs of drivers in order to provide
them with adequate information adapted to the situation.
Trust in Automation
Among other things, our work studies how we can maintain a
trustful communication between vehicles and drivers in the context
of critical situations. Therefore, we discuss research about trust in
automation [26, 28, 39, 43, 45, 54] in the following. Madhavan and
Wiegmann found that the process of forming trust in a machine
differs from trusting humans [43]. This is because humans initially
treat other people with caution [54]. The trust relationship is built
slowly, as long as the other person does not make any mistakes.
In contrast to this, people usually assume that machines function
flawlessly. Hence, they encounter themwith a trust advance [39, 43].
With every mistake the machine makes, this trust is then corrected
downwards [11]. However, this effect only occurs if the person has
had no previous contact with the machine [43].
Investigating Car Drivers’ Information Demand after Safety and Security Critical Incidents CHI ’21, May 8–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan
3 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Remote keyless system (RKS) technology was first introduced in
cars in the 1980’s [37]. Since then, the underlying technology of
RKS has continuously evolved after each version was demonstrated
to be exploitable. At the time of writing this, it uses encrypted
rolling codes. However, this is also vulnerable to exploits as shown
in various demonstrations [13, 20–22, 24, 33], the last one as re-
cently as November 2020 [24]. This is most likely due to incorrect
implementation of protocols or reliance on flawed protocols. The
most common of these exploits are relay attacks (which repeat the
signal from the driver’s key to the car from a large distance using
relays) and replay attacks which capture and block valid signals
from the driver’s key fob and use these signals later on. Vulnerabil-
ities in cars are not limited only to car keys [67]. Researchers have
already gained control of a moving car while sitting in the back
seat [17] as well as from kilometers away [18]. They gained control
of the steering wheel, brakes, windshield wiper, air conditioner,
and the dashboard system. Recently, researchers found that they
could fool Tesla’s autopilot program into believing “phantom” signs.
They were able to trick a Tesla to stop, by flashing a stop sign for a
second on a billboard next to the road [23]. Apart from malicious
intrusions, the computer systems of a car may suffer from techni-
cal malfunctions. The video used in our study shows an example
of when the autopilot failed to recognize objects in its path and
crashed through construction barrels [68].
As the number of computerized features in cars increases, so does
the potential for exploits andmalfunctions to be life-threatening [55,
68]. While car systems currently do not communicate warning
messages about third party interference to the driver, scientists are
working on solutions to detect malicious intrusions in vehicles to
safeguard their internal functioning and ensure that such exploit
attempts are thwarted [7, 10, 14, 46, 48, 66]. Such mechanisms can
possibly be further developed to alert drivers about third-party
intrusions.
For this study we chose scenarios inspired by technical malfunc-
tions and exploits that either occurred in the real world or were
demonstrated to be feasible by scientists. However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is currently no mechanism to alert drivers
of an ongoing attack, even if it were detected. For this study we
assume the car is capable of such a detection and notification to
the driver, to investigate which information people need in critical
situations.
4 METHODOLOGY
Our study is designed to elicit drivers’ information demand de-
pending on different critical situations. Hence, our study lays the
foundation to improve in-car risk communication to drivers and to
provide helpful information at appropriate times. Accordingly, we
identified the following research questions:
RQ1: What information do drivers demand for safety- and
security-critical incidents?
RQ2: Which factors moderate information demand after criti-
cal incidents?
RQ3: Which error sources for safety- and security critical inci-
dents do drivers think of?
Since it would be unethical to put participants into critical situa-
tions we use an online survey with scenarios to investigate their
attitudes, trust, satisfaction, and information demands. To cover a
broad spectrum of situations, we selected a high-critical scenario
(crashing against construction barriers) and a low-critical scenario
(key malfunction). We specifically chose ambiguous scenarios in
which the cause of vehicle malfunctions is not obvious. Since we
confront participants with hypothetical scenarios, the participants
(“drivers”) are relieved from all driving-related tasks. This constraint
is further strengthened as the car in the scenarios is not moving
at the time we elicit participants’ information demand. After each
scenario, participants fill out a questionnaire with qualitative and
quantitative questions. We apply Correspondence Analysis (CA) to
investigate which factors moderate drivers’ information demand.
We describe each of the identified correlations in detail using quali-
tative data from the free text response questions.
4.1 Online Survey
All participants (𝑁 = 60) are exposed to two scenarios (C: crashing
against construction barriers and K: key malfunction) in a randomly
chosen sequence. Each scenario contains (1) an introductory text, (2)
a description of the situation, and (3) the vehicle’s explanation. The
vehicle explains its behavior with one of the following explanations
(randomly assigned per participant and used for both scenarios):
malicious intrusion (MI, 𝑁 = 17) by third parties, a technical
malfunction (TM, 𝑁 = 19), or with no explanation (NO, 𝑁 =
24). Hence, scenarios (C and K) are studied within subjects and
explanations (MI, TM, NO) are studied between subjects. After each
scenario, participants fill out a questionnaire about their experience.
The supplementary material provides the scenarios as presented to
the participants.
Introductory text. The introductory text embeds each scenario
in the setting of partially-autonomous vehicles by describing the
vehicle’s capabilities and limitations. This introduction directly
addresses the participant to make the setting more tangible, thus
making it easier for the participant to immerse into the situation.
The text describes the car’s functionality according to the claims
on Tesla’s website [61]. In particular, that it can automatically steer,
accelerate, and brake within its lane. However, the text explicitly
states that active driver supervision is required at all times. We did
not want to study a specific brand of vehicle, but used the Tesla
description for a realistic abstraction of such a vehicle. Hence, we
did not specify the brand of the car in the survey. From the video
illustrating scenario C, one cannot infer which car it is. Additionally,
we omitted a description of the center console or visual represen-
tation of the error message to minimize the influence of factors
beyond our main focus.
We chose scenarios in which the vehicle communicates a mal-
function that could have been caused by a functional error or a
malicious attacker. We hypothesize that in such cases the driver
cannot identify the source of the malfunction without further con-
text.
Scenario C: Crashing against construction barriers. This scenario
asks the participant to imagine driving on the highway with an
activated autopilot. The description explicitly emphasizes that this
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Figure 1: Scenario C: a vehicle crashing into construction
barrels as presented in the survey. The supplementary ma-
terial provides the complete version of the survey.
requires active driver supervision. Just like the introductory text
of the setting, this description is designed to be as tangible and
immersive as possible. Hence, it contains elements that should
make it easy for the study participant to imagine herself in the
situation. For example, instead of simply saying that the driver
was briefly inattentive, the text provides a vivid description of
why this is the case: “You receive a text message from your best
friend to which you reply immediately.” This not only ensures that
the study participants can better identify with the situation but
also establishes a common ground and thus leaves less room for
interpretation and misunderstandings.
The actual situation is presented in a 22-second video [68]. It
shows the collision of a vehicle with construction site barrels from
the driver’s perspective. This scenario is based on an actual event: A
dashcam recorded this situation in a Tesla while the car’s autopilot
failed. In the video, the vehicle drives towards the end of a highway
lane that is closed due to construction. For an unknown reason, it
does not recognize the construction site barrier. The driver reacts
too late and only intervenes after the vehicle has hit 10 barrels1.
Figure 1 depicts the entire description of the scenario as presented
to the participants. After this video, another tangible description
clarifies that the driver, not the vehicle, activated the brake.
The vehicle in this scenario responds in one of three ways to the
incident: explaining its behavior with a malicious intrusion (MI ),
1According to the video description the driver fell asleep behind the wheel of his Tesla.
Although the driver acknowledges that the accident was mainly his fault, the vehicle
is also held accountable: “Automatic Emergency Braking totally failed me on the one
time we needed it most. With all the phantom braking events we have experienced in the
2½months we’ve owned it, it does seem like it would panic when it saw this coming.” [68]
Note: The owner of the video has since taken it offline. Please contact the authors of
this paper if you have further questions regarding it.
attributing it to a technical malfunction (TM), or not explaining at
all (NO):
MI You look at the car’s center console and learn that your car’s
behavior was caused by a hacker. They temporarily took control
of the vehicle and steered it into the construction barrels.
TM You look at the car’s center console and learn that your car’s
behavior was caused by a sensor malfunction. The front sensors
did not recognize the construction barrels, causing the incident.
NO [no explanation is offered]
After participants experienced the scenario and the vehicle’s ex-
planation, the survey continues with the open and closed questions
shown in Table 1.
Scenario K: Key malfunction. In this scenario, the driver wants
to unlock her vehicle with a remote key fob. However, it does not
respond the first time and the driver needs to press the “unlock”
button again to unlock the vehicle. We chose this scenario because
the problem of cloning keys has been present for many years [13,
19, 20, 33, 34] and was recently prominent in the media again when
a Tesla was stolen from a driveway [58]. Furthermore, this scenario
is less critical than the other one, as it usually only causes material
damage without threatening the lives of the vehicle’s occupants.
The attack mentioned by the malicious intrusion explanation refers
to key fobs and vehicles that synchronize using rolling codes [33].
The vehicle in this scenario responds in one of three ways to the
incident: explaining its behavior with a malicious intrusion (MI ),
attributing it to a technical malfunction (TM), or not explaining at
all (NO):
MI When you look at the car’s center console you learn that some-
one may have cloned your key and can now use it to unlock
your vehicle.
TM When you look at the car’s center console you learn that the
battery charge of your key is weak and that you need to replace
it soon.
NO [no explanation is offered]
After participants experienced the scenario and the vehicle’s
explanation, the survey continues with the open and closed-ended
questions shown in Table 1.
Questionnaire. After each scenario, participants answered four
qualitative open-ended questions regarding their (1) perception of
the scenario, (2) next actions, (3) feelings about the scenario, and
(4) demand for information. Likewise, participants answered four
quantitative closed-ended questions regarding their (1) satisfaction
with the vehicle’s response, (2) trust in automation (using Jian et
al.’s [31] scale), and (3) operational intent. All quantitative questions
asked for a response on a 7-point Likert scale. Table 1 lists all
qualitative and quantitative questions asked after each scenario.
4.2 Pilot Study
The goal of the pilot tests was to test and improve the compre-
hension of questions and scenario descriptions. We conducted a
total of 6 pilot tests in which we asked participants to think-aloud
while completing the survey. This not only allowed optimization
of the texts and questions, but also revealed layout flaws. We iter-
atively conducted pilot tests and directly incorporated the results
into the survey after each round of testing. We continued until we
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Table 1: Questionnaire after each scenario containing qualitative and quantitative questions.
Measure Scenario Question Answer Type
Perception/ Attention What do you think happened in this scenario? free text
Action What will you do next as the driver? free text
Driver Feeling How do you feel about the vehicles response? free text
Information Demand What information should the car provide about the situation? free text
Vehicle Satisfaction I am satisfied with the vehicles behaviour in this specific situation. 7-point Likert
Trust in Automation Scale According to Jian et al. [31] adjusted to partially-autonomous vehicles 7-point Likert
Operational Intent After experiencing this incident, I would buy a vehicle of this kind again. 7-point Likert
I would sue the manufacturer of the partially-autonomous vehicle. 7-point Likert
I would continue to use the partially-autonomous vehicle. 7-point Likert
I would warn my family and friends about the partially-autonomous vehicle. 7-point Likert
had covered every condition once and the participants completed
the survey without any problems. Based on the outcome of the
pilot tests we adjusted phrasing of the open-ended questions and
conditions. For example, we slightly rephrased some questions to
clarify the direct reference to the scenario. Additionally, we added
gray bars to the left of each paragraph to provide visual guidance.
The final analysis does not include the results of the pilot tests. We
recruited pilot test participants from our university achieving an
even distribution of women and men, computer-science students,
and administrative employees, aged 23-45.
4.3 Recruitment and Participants
We recruited 𝑁 = 60 study participants from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) [63]. Participants were randomly assigned to con-
ditions (MI, TM, NO), resulting in an uneven distribution among
conditions. We carefully balanced sample size considerations for
our mixed methods study. We performed power calculations to esti-
mate the number of participants for the quantitative analysis. For a
statistical power of 0.8 and 𝛼 = .05 we estimated 60-80 participants
for a medium effect size. With regard to the qualitative analysis,
we are confident that the number of participants is sufficient as we
reached saturation (see Section 4.4).
We chose MTurk because it enables us to effectively investigate
the information demand of a broad set of people, as opposed to
e.g. lab studies. Additionally, we wanted a culturally homogeneous
sample that is known to be suitable for security research. Prior
work by Redmiles et al. suggests that MTurk responses regarding
security and privacy experiences, advice sources, and knowledge
are more representative of the U.S. population than are responses
from a census-representative panel [50]. To participate in our study,
MTurk workers needed to own a car and be located in the US. We
selected car ownership as a criterion to ensure that participants
have experience with regular cars. None of the participants owned
a partially-autonomous car. 13 participants reported having previ-
ous experience in driving or riding cars with autonomous driving
features. Driving experience varied between 7 and 52 years (median
21, mean 23.94). Additionally, we required a HIT Approval Rate2
for all Requesters’ HITs greater than 95%, and that they have more
2“A Human Intelligence Task, or HIT, is a question that needs an answer. A HIT
represents a single, self-contained, virtual task that a Worker can work on, submit an
than 100 approved HITs. In the pilot test, participants completed
the survey in about 20 minutes, so we compensated participants
with $3 for the completion of the survey. However, participants
invested more time than anticipated (26 minutes on average) which
resulted in a wage below the US federal minimum ($7.25). To rem-
edy this situation, we gave a $0.50 bonus to all participants. A total
of 23 woman and 27 men took part in our study with ages ranging
between 24 and 73 (median 27, mean 40.67). Table 3 in the appendix
shows a detailed overview of our participants’ demographics.
4.4 Coding Procedure
We used open coding according to Strauss and Corbin [60] to eval-
uate the qualitative data. In total, we created 6 codebooks, one for
each scenario and condition.
Two researchers independently coded answers to open-ended
questions for each scenario and condition in two iterations. Initially,
one of them skimmed the first half of each dataset and constructed
an initial version of the codebook. The draft version of the code-
book captured the dataset’s concepts and topics. Afterward, both
researchers used this codebook to code the second half of the data.
They tagged pieces of the answers with labels, at once summarizing,
categorizing, and describing the data [6]. After this first iteration
of coding, the two researchers discussed their codes and adapted
the codebook accordingly. During the second iteration, the two
researchers coded the first half of the dataset. In cases where the
discussion of the second iteration also led to a change in the code-
book, the researchers coded the second half of the dataset again.
This resulted in an inter-rater reliability Krippendorff’s 𝛼 [35] be-
tween 0.77 and 0.91 for each codebook. We achieved saturation
after the first coding iteration for 5 codebooks. In the Crash, NO
condition one participant reported to repair the sensor which added
a new concept to this codebook in the second coding iteration.
4.5 Analysis
We conducted Thematic Analysis [4] to identify topics, correlations
and themes in the coded data. Further, we applied Correspondence
answer, and collect a reward for completing. HITs are created by Requester customers
in order to be completed by Worker customers.” [64]
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Analysis [16] to explore the relationship between different situa-
tional factors and the occurrence of information demand codes. The
information demand codes are a result of the open coding proce-
dure from the previous section. The different situational factors that
might moderate information demand are a result of the Thematic
Analysis.
4.6 Ethical Considerations
Our university’s ethical review board (ERB) evaluated and approved
this research project. To enable informed consent, we explained
the study objective to the participants, stated that participation is
voluntary and that they may abort the survey at any time. Further,
we did not collect any personally identifiable information (PII). At
the end of the survey, we provided links to our webpage and contact
information in case participants had further questions.
5 RESULTS
We first used Thematic Analysis to identify concepts, topics and
connections in the coded data. Those insights then form the ba-
sis for a subsequent Correspondence Analysis of situation-related
information needs. Table 2 shows an overview of all information
types elicited in the study with explanations and quotations. Table 4
in the Appendix shows a comparison of all codebooks grouped by
themes. All quotes in this section are unaltered including spelling
mistakes.
5.1 Results of Thematic Analysis
The results of the Thematic Analysis are grouped by high level codes
about perceived error causes. For each, we report on similarities
and differences, as well as specifics of both scenarios. In addition,
we talk about differences in the perception of both scenarios and
about first trends in the need for information.
5.1.1 Malicious Intrusion as Perceived Error Source. Across both
scenarios nobody thought of security breaches as possible error
sources, unless they were primed for it in the MI condition. This
suggests that security breaches are a concept that is not deeply
rooted in people’s minds when it comes to driving. However, if the
participants were then made aware of a malicious intrusion, this
was perceived differently depending on the situation.
In the key scenario people were unsure about how the attack was
carried out: “I don’t know how someone would go about cloning a
key.” (P34). They tried to make sense of the situation, each coming
up with different explanations to what might have happened, being
more or less close to the actual attack we had in mind: “Someone
accessed the computer in the vehicle and made a clone of the entry
system.” (P37), “[...] there was someone standing nearby with some
sort of rf reader and intercepted the authentication code used to unlock
the vehicle. the first click to unlock the vehicle did nothing because it
went to the interceptor, the second time unlocked because it was gong
to the car, not the rf reader” (P20). 2 participants thought that the
malfunction was actually a security functionality, impeding attacks:
“it’s actually good that it doesn’t unlock right away because it will take
longer for the hacker to access it” (P37). The participants reacted to
the key scenario with mixed feelings. 5 participants perceived the
scenario as scary (P30). One participant expressed that “Hacking
is a real concern.” (P21). However, at the same time 9 participants
perceived the warning of the car in a positive way, e.g. stating that
they were satisfied (P21,63), and happy (P65). This is likely the
case because the car warned its driver prior to a potential theft:
“Since the car wasn’t stolen/missing after a stranger cloned my key,
it seems the security features are working for the time being” (P29).
Nevertheless trust issues may remain as one participant stated “I
would be paranoid about the issue really being resolved once it had
been corrected.” (P34).
In the crash scenario participants understood that the accident was
caused by a malicious intrusion, but were uncertain about what
exactly happened: “somehow the hacker was able to disable the safety
features of the vehicle [...]” (P20). Additionally, participants had dif-
ferent ideas about hacker capabilities. For example, 1 participant
stated that “The car should have stopped much quicker. Even if a
hacker impacted the steering, the brakes should have been activated
because of collision warnings.” (P27), and a second one stated: “[...]
I would figure the systems would only allow things like that if they
were being manually overridden from withing the car itself” (P39).
To add to this, 7 participants stated that they would continue to
drive manually, while only 2 reported to call the police or get the
car towed. 12 participants had predominantly negative feelings
with regard to the car’s behavior, stating they were irritated (P29),
and angry (P52). In contrast to the key scenario, participants did
not appreciate the car’s explanation of the situation. This is likely
because the accident already happened and the car failed to notify
the driver early. 2 participants explicitly classified the situation as
potentially lethal: “[...] It is scary to think that someone can hack the
system and potentially kill you. [...]” (P30). With regard to responsi-
bility, 15 participants held hackers (P4) accountable for the accident.
Out of those, 5 participants acknowledged that the driver is guilty
of not paying attention to the road and 1 person blames “[...] the
people who designed the vehicle [...] ” (P34).
5.1.2 Technical Malfunction as Perceived Error Source. Technical
malfunctions were the most named error sources in the NO and
TM conditions across both scenarios. Thereby, participants demon-
strated a good understanding of and intuition for technical error
sources. In general, the concepts and themes mentioned in the NO
and TM conditions broadly overlapped in both scenarios.
13 participants identified a “bad battery” (P24) as a potential error
in the key scenario, NO condition. In the TM condition everybody
who correctly understood the scenario identified the key’s battery
as the error source. 3 participants misinterpreted the scenario to be
about an electric vehicle.We excluded them from the analysis of this
scenario. In TM condition, the majority had neutral to slightly pos-
itive feelings about the car, describing its behavior as helpful (P19),
and acceptable (P9). 5 participants had negative feelings, expressing
they would “prefer that it [the car] warns me before the battery gets
so low that i may stop working correctly” (P33). In the NO condition
the majority had neutral to slightly negative feelings, stating that
batteries being low are a common occurrence (P22) and that they
“didn’t like how it [the car] was unresponsive” (P24).
In the crash scenario 15 participants thought the accident was
caused by a technical malfunction in the NO condition. In the
TM condition, 22 participants correctly attributed the error to a
sensor malfunction (P32). In both conditions the majority was ex-
tremely unsatisfied with the car’s reaction, stating they were “upset
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Table 2: Consolidated codebook of participants’ information demand across all scenarios and conditions
Code Description Example Quotes
Question Types
What What happened in the situation? “It should provide a report of what happened [. . . ]”, “It should saythat there is a breach in the system or something of that regard [. . . ]”
Why Why did the malfunction occur? “It should also have some kind of an explanation as to why it didn’t brake”
Who Who is the attacker? “Who is responsible.”
When When did the attack happen? “when it was hacked”
How How did the attack happen? “Any information about how it was exploited by the hacker”
Car
Status Status information of malfunctioning parts “Status of the remote; low battery indicator; weak signal strength maybe"
Diagnostic Report Car’s diagnostic report, e.g. error codes, damage
“The car should provide a report about the damage - when the car
collided with a hazard, how fast it was traveling, any potential damage
to look out for”, “if the autopilot is still working”
Decision Process Car’s internal decision process leading to accident “How it interpreted the situation and any negative reactions to the incident.”
Parameters Car’s parameters during accident, e.g. velocity etc.
“show a graph of some sort of how long/distance it continued driving from
the first hit of a cone to when the vehicle eventually stopped along with the
speed, if it slowed down at all etc”
General Usage General information about how to use the car “How many clicks is necessary to unlock the car”
Situation
Preventative Measures How can such accidents be avoided in the future? ‘[. . . ] what steps I can take next to keep this from happening again.”
Message Message, Warning, or Alert about Incident “It can send a message that it only got a partial signal the first time.”,“It would be great if the car could give a warning [. . . ]”
Troubleshooting Information to resolve the issue manually andclues to find the attacker
“It should tell you when it was copied and that way you could try to figure
out who it was”
Recommendations Recommendation how to react to the situation “Do the sensors need to be checked?”
Quality of Warning
Visual Demand visual message “The car should save the visual evidence if it has a built in dash cam”
Audio Demand audible message “The car should have an automatic warning system [. . . ] like a voice warning”
Before/During Demand message prior to or during the incident “The car should have sounded a warning of the cones approaching.”
None
None No information demand “Nothing at all, unless there’s a reason why the fob truly needed morepresses [. . . ]”, “Nothing really, it seems self-explanatory to me”
and frightened” (P19), “surprised and a little panicked” (P32), or
scared (P23). The message in the TM condition had no positive
effect on the overall impression of the situation. Similar to the MI
condition, participants demanded to “be forewarned if a sensor is
failing or has failed” (P69). In terms of liability, 7 participants in
the TM and 9 participants in the NO condition held the driver ac-
countable for the accident: “The driver (me) was not paying adequate
attention to the situation [...]” (P28). 8 participants in the TM and 3
participants in the NO condition blamed poor design: “Apparently
the sensors weren’t programmed to recognize the particular obstacles
[...]” (P15), “Shouldn’t the vehicle be able to recognize the signs warn-
ing of the lane ending in the first place.” (P33). 1 participant wanted
the car to “acknowledge that it made a mistake” (P39).
5.1.3 Human Error as Perceived Error Sources. Apart from technical
malfunctions and malicious intrusions, participants also identified
other potential error sources. Especially if no explanation for the
car’s behavior was offered, participants blamed the malfunction on
themselves across both scenarios. In the key scenario, 6 participants
in the NO condition made statements like “Sometimes [...] you don’t
press it [the key] correctly so you need to do it again” (P22), or “I didn’t
press the button hard enough” (P49). Nobody mentioned human
failure as the error source in the TM or MI condition in the key
scenario. In the crash scenario, on the other hand, the concept
came up more frequently. This is likely the case, as the description
pointed out that the driver was inattentive. Here, 9 participants of
the NO condition stated that they “stopped paying attention in a
situation where I should have been supervising” (P25). 6 participants
(TM) and 5 participants (MI ) made similar statements.
5.1.4 Design of the Car as Perceived Error Source. Some partici-
pants thought the malfunctions were not actual malfunctions, but
intended by design, e.g. in the key scenario, or limits of the cars
functionality in the crash scenario. When no explanation was given
in the key scenario, 5 participants explained the car’s malfunction
with statements like: “The car was programmed to unlock at two
clicks [...]” (P48). Note, that out of those 3 participants understood
the malfunction as a security feature: “I feel safer with this and
know that my car would not open for just any one just for the remote
that I have” (P59). Nobody in the MI or TM conditions thought
the malfunction was intended by design. In the crash scenario
3 participants in the NO and 6 participants in the TM condition
thought that the malfunction was due to limited functionality of
the autopilot: “The car was apparently only programmed for any


























Figure 2: Overview of how information demand (in the background) corresponds to the perceived cause of error (colored boxes)
across both scenarios.
side abstruction” (P74), or “I think the vehicle got confused. It knew
there was a road there but wasn’t aware of the construction.” (P56).
Nobody in the MI condition thought the malfunction was due to
gaps in functionality.
5.1.5 Perceived Criticality of Scenario. The qualitative findings sug-
gest that participants perceive the key scenario less critical than
the crash scenario. This is indicated by different impressions partic-
ipants have about both scenarios as well as their reported actions
to the scenarios. However, the MI condition of the key scenario
constitutes a special case, as 14 participants reported on calling the
police or contacting the manufacturer. Thus, this condition was
also perceived as more critical. The overall gap between key and
crash scenario was also evident in the quantitative data. The scores
of trust, operational intent, and satisfaction in the key scenario
were significantly higher than in the crash scenario. For each de-
pendent variable we ran MANOVA. The test provides information
about Wald-type statistic (WTS), the ANOVA-type statistic (ATS)
and re-sampling versions of these test statistics [57]. Using WTS
and ATS, there was a significant effect of the scenarios on the trust
scale rating, satisfaction rating, and operational intent rating, df=1,
p<0.001.
5.1.6 First Trends in the Need for Information. A fundamental need
for information of the study participants became apparent across
scenarios and conditions. It includes the questions why the mal-
function occurred and what happened in the situation. In addition,
the need to receive a warning or message from the car was widely
expressed. Depending on the perceived severity of the situation and
on the error source, participants asked for additional information.
Figure 2 illustrates the information types, grouped by perceived
error source across all scenarios. For technical malfunctions partic-
ipants generally cared more about information on the car and were
more specific about the kind of warning they wanted. If participants
thought a malicious intrusion was the error source, they were more
interested in information about the situation including different
question types about the attack. The perceived error source human
failure resulted in interest about how to properly use the car or the
key. Last but not least, if participants thought the malfunction was
due to limited functionality they wanted to know more about the
car’s internal decision process.
In the following section, we present the results from our Correspon-
dence Analysis to identify more fine-grained trends in information
demand.
5.2 Correspondence Analysis
Based on the Thematic Analysis, we identified different situational
factors that might moderate information demand (moderating fac-
tors):
• Highly Critical Situations (HiCrit) Participant perceived
the situation as highly critical.
• Less Critical Situations (LessCrit) Participant perceived
the situation as less critical.
• Technical Malfunction (TM) Participant identified a tech-
nical malfunction as the error cause.
• Malicious Intrusion (MI) Participant identified amalicious
intrusion as the error cause.
• Human Failure (Human) Participant identified a human
failure as the error cause.
• Design of Car (Design) Participant perceived the malfunc-
tion as an intended design choice.
• Life Threatening (Threat) Participant perceived the situ-
ation as life-threatening.
• Positive Impression (Pos) Participant had a positive im-
pression of the car’s response to the situation.
• Negative Impression (Neg) Participant had a negative im-
pression of the car’s response to the situation.
• Neutral Impression (Neut) Participant had a neutral im-
pression of the car’s response to the situation.
We applied Correspondence Analysis betweenmoderating factors
and information demand codes (shown in Table 2) to explore their
relationship. We explored this relationship using biplots (shown in
Figure 5) and checked each conclusion against the raw data. These
biplots visualize the relationship between the moderating factors
(blue dots) and information demand (red triangles). Put simply, the
further away labels are from the origin, the more discriminating
they are, and smaller angles between a moderating factor and an






























































































Figure 4: Crash scenario
Figure 5: Asymmetric biplots ofmoderating factors (blue dots) and information demand codes (red triangles). The dimensions
correspond to the eigenvalues that cover the largest percentage of variance.
information demand label (connected through the origin) indicate
an association of the two.
Relative inertias indicate for each cell of the contingency table
(refer to Tables 10 and 7 in the Appendix) the relative contribution
to the total value of the chi-square statistic. The higher the value of
a cell, the higher the association of the respective row and column
categories. We report relationships with relative inertia larger than
0.01 only if they are grounded in the qualitative data.
Appendix C provides tables with exact results of the Correspon-
dence Analysis. The following paragraphs report on information
demand trends depending on moderating factors.
5.2.1 Perceived Error Cause. Participants identifying a malicious
intrusion (MI) as the error cause in a scenario, was globally a
strongly discriminating factor for information demand. Participants
were more interested in information about the situation than in
information about the car. In the crash scenario MI was the only
factor that had an impact on information demand. It led to increased
demand for the information typesWho, When, How, Preventative
Measures, Troubleshooting, and Action Recommendations. In the key
scenario MI is a strongly discriminating factor. Similar to the crash
scenario there is increased demand for Who, When, Preventative,
Recommendations. One participant asked “how and when it [the key]
was cloned” (P37). This person thought that the car’s computer was
hacked to clone the key and that the second click on the key was a
security mechanism. Because of this How is also closely associated
with the moderating factor Design.
Globally, the perceived error cause technicalmalfunction (TM)
resulted in participants being more interested in information about
the car and being more specific about the quality of warning they
want. In the crash scenario TM led to increased demand for the
type Before: “The car should have indicated there was something in
it’s path.” (P8). A positive impression of the car’s response to the
situation is an outlier in the crash scenario. It is positively associ-
ated with Decision. This is the case because only two participants
demanded information about the internal reasoning of the car in
the situation and one of them misunderstood the situation at least
partially: “It’s ability to recognize a collision and pull to the side of the
road is good.” (P58). In the key scenario TM let to increased demand
for Status information and less demand forWhen and Troubleshoot-
ing.
Globally, the perceived error cause human failure (Human)
is not a strongly discriminating factor. It is more closely associ-
ated with technical malfunctions. In the crash scenario and NO
condition one participant wanted information about “[...] changing
lanes” (P42) which led to increased demand for the type Usage.
Human failure is a discriminating factor in the key scenario with
increased demand of the types Usage and None. Participants typ-
ically wanted to know “how many clicks [are] necessary to unlock
the car” (P48).
2 participants perceived the malfunction as an intended Design
feature of the car in the crash scenario. They were interested in
“how it [the car] interpreted the situation and any negative reactions to
the incident.” (P58). Additionally, they had the impression that the
car pondered on what would be the best reaction to the situation
“[...] the autopilot made the best decision of the situation. Staying on
the lane was safer than swerving to either lane. [...]” (P35), and hu-
manizing it “I would hope that it knows it made a mistake [...]” (P38).
In the key scenario the design factor is more closely associated
with the perceived error cause malicious intrusion. This is because
participants perceived the double clicking of the key as an addition
security feature: “In the manual there should be an explanation of
why I would have to push the button twice and if there is a trouble
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shooter for this” (P59). People demanded more information about
Who, How, Usage, Troubleshooting.
5.2.2 Criticality of the situation. Across both scenarios participants
associated highly critical situations (HiCrit) more closely with
technical malfunctions and malicious intrusions than with human
failure or design issues. Highly critical situations did not spark in-
creased information demand with any particular information type
in the crash scenario. Participants were broadly interested in all
information types they were aware of. In the Key scenario, par-
ticipants associated highly critical situations more strongly with
malicious intrusions than with other perceived error causes. This
resulted in an increased information demand of When, Preventa-
tive Measures and Action Recommendations. There was decreased
demand for Status and None.
Globally, situations which participants perceived as less critical
or not critical (LessCrit) are a strongly discriminating factor for
information demand. In those situations participants had increased
demand for the information types Status, Usage and None and de-
creased demand for Before. There is no evidence in the codebook
that the crash scenario was perceived less critical. This is why Less-
Crit is not present as a moderating factor in Figure 4. In the Key
scenario less critical situations are more strongly associated with
technical malfunctions. There is increased information demand for
the types Status and None. The demand for the information types
When, Preventative Measures, Troubleshooting, and Action Recom-
mendations decreased.
6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
First, we discuss the combined results of perceived error causes and
situational characteristics to highlight the lessons learned. Based on
those we derive actionable implications for design that may form
the baseline for a meaningful communication of technical error
sources and malicious intrusions.
Our analysis of information demand indicates differences be-
tween (1) scenarios perceived as less or highly critical, and (2)
between the error causes technical malfunction (TM) and malicious
intrusion (MI ). While the fundamental need for information re-
mained similar across the conditions and scenarios, participants
demanded additional information depending how they perceived
the error source. Furthermore, we observe a more differentiated
splitting of information codes between TM and MI in the key sce-
nario, which is perceived as less critical, than in the crash scenario,
which is perceived as highly critical. A key finding is that while
the participants could imagine many different causes of vehicle
failures from technical malfunctions, human error, to deliberate
design decisions, no one mentioned malicious intrusions. However,
we argue that complete threat models cannot be expected from
drivers, and that the gaps we have identified must be taken into
account to support drivers when they need it most. For this reason,
the following discussion pays special attention to the specifics of
MI error causes and differentiates them from the needs in terms of
TM error causes.
6.1 Lessons Learned about Perceived Error
Causes
The experimental setup not only allowed an investigation of given
error causes, but also revealed which error sources and threats the
participants were aware of. We found that, if possible, participants
tried to find simple explanations for the presented scenarios. This
resulted in an increased attribution to human failure in the NO
condition across both scenarios. Additionally, participants com-
monly named technical malfunctions as potential error sources in
all conditions. This may be due to the fact that cars used to cope
with mostly technical malfunctions in the past, and cars suffering
from malicious intrusions are at the moment still the rare exception.
Interestingly, participants tried to explain malfunctions as intended
design choices, e.g., to enhance the security of the vehicle. This
was mentioned in the context of clicking twice to unlock the car
in the key scenario and could potentially be borrowed from expe-
riences in the online world, such as Two-Factor Authentication.
However, this at least indicates fuzzy concepts with regard to en-
hancing security which is not an uncommon concept. E.g. Distler et
al. found that software displaying security mechanisms to its users
is better received than equal software that does not [8]. Apart from
this, participants demonstrated no sensitivity to security. Unless
primed for it, nobody thought of security breaches in the context
of car accidents. This indicates the need for guidance in security
critical situations and is reflected by the increased demand for the
information type Action Recommendation. Moreover our results
indicate that simply stating the error cause is not enough in highly
critical situations. While this is sufficient to place the scenario in
the correct context, it is not sufficient to help participants assess
and react to the situation correctly. This is true for both TM and
MI.
6.2 Lessons Learned about Situational Factors
We found that the more critically the situation is perceived, the
greater the need for information but the worse the situation is per-
ceived in terms of trust, satisfaction and intentions to act, regardless
of whether the car offers an explanation or not. This coincides with
the results of Lim and Dey [40], who also found that people in
critical situations have a broad need for information and are diffi-
cult to satisfy even if their information demand is met. We believe
that in the context of vehicles, however, it is precisely these ex-
treme situations that require special attention, since people need
the best possible information, especially in critical, potentially life-
threatening scenarios. For less critical situations, on the other hand,
it was already possible in this study to satisfy the participants’ need
for information. The majority of participants was satisfied with the
explanation that the battery was empty and needed to be replaced
in the key scenario. This was reflected in a neutral to positive im-
pression and a reduced need for information. This scenario also
illustrates the key issue our study tackles: how critically a situation
is perceived depends on its context. Since the participants do not
consider MI as a source of error, they are dependent on a classifica-
tion of the situation. However, the context and thus the need for
information changes through the classification. If MI is then identi-
fied as the error source in the key scenario, the participants classify
the scenario as critical, also reflected by dropping satisfaction and
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operational intent scores. At the same time, they are grateful for
the indication of a possible security breach.
6.3 Implications for Design
All implications for design are based on the the findings of the
Thematic and Correspondence Analysis and have to be validated
in future work. We identified a fundamental information demand
across all conditions and scenarios. Communicating the error cause
(Why), explaining What happened in the situation and alerting
the driver (Warning/Message) help to describe the situation and
make the driver aware of malfunctions or threats. Depending on the
situation and malfunction drivers wanted additional information. In
case of MI, participants were typically interested in situational and
attack specific information. The following design recommendations
can help drivers to understand security critical situations and to
act accordingly:
(1) Provide Precise Action Recommendations. Across both
scenarios, the study participants wanted concrete recommen-
dations for action. These could relate, for example, to what
should be done next in a concrete situation, such as calling
the police. However, it can also be higher level recommen-
dations on how to remedy the security breach. Information
types: Action Recommendation
(2) Explicitly Communicate Threats. In the crash scenario
many of the study participants misjudged the current threat
situation. This led to most of the participants simply driv-
ing on, which could be potentially life-threatening in this
scenario. Therefore it is important to communicate threats
realistically and understandably. Information types:What,
Why, Message/Warning
(3) Communicate PreventativeMeasures. Participants across
both scenarios demanded information on how to prevent
security breaches of this kind in the future. This information
not only contributes to a better understanding of the situ-
ation, but at the same time educates the driver and makes
her sensitive to the subject. Information types: Preventative
Measures
(4) Provide Information About the Attack Vector. The ma-
jority of participants wanted to know what happened and
how this was possible. It is important to communicate the
information at a level that the drivers can understand. Here
it may be necessary to adapt the information to the level
of expertise of the driver or to have her select the degree
of detail she wants to know about. Information types: Who,
When, How
(5) Provide Investigative Cues.Many participants wished for
hints that could help them identify the attacker, e.g., the
time and place of the attack or whether someone has already
gained access to the vehicle. Information types: Diagnostic
Report, Troubleshooting, Who, When, How
People in the TM and NO conditions, however, were interested
in different types of information. They typically demanded more
information about the car and were more specific about the quality
of warnings they expected. The following design recommenda-
tions could serve as a baseline to design suitable communication
structures for technical malfunctions:
(1) Provide Visual and Auditory Alerts. The study partici-
pants demanded visual and auditory signals, which ideally
draw their attention to the defective part before malfunc-
tions occur. This can be, for example, a beep sound to attract
the driver’s attention, or a flash of the key before the bat-
tery charge becomes too low. Information types: Message/
Warning, Visual, Audio, Before/During
(2) Provide Status Information of Malfunctioning Parts.
Study participants most often inquired about the status of
the faulty parts. In the key malfunction scenario, they wanted
information about the battery status and how long the charge
would last. In the crash scenario they demanded information
about the state of the front sensor. Information types: Status
(3) ProvideDiagnosticReport. Some of the study participants
requested a diagnostic report from the vehicle. The report
should contain information about the malfunction and the
damage report. Additionally the car’s parameters during the
accident such as velocity can be supplemented. Information
types: Diagnostic Report, Parameters
(4) Communicate Next Actions. Similar to the MI condition,
the study participants wanted actionable recommendations.
However, they focus more on what the driver needs to do
in order to repair the defect and relate less to the specific
circumstances of the situation. Information types: Action
Recommendation
(5) Explain Car’s Internal Decision Process. Some partici-
pants thought the malfunction was due to the autopilot’s
lacking functionality. They were interested in how the car
perceived the situation and what caused it to misbehave.
Information types: Decision Process, Why
Our results are consistent with the four principles supporting
intelligibility and accountability in context-aware systems [3]. Here,
the identified information types of our study complement the prin-
ciples with details for the domain of semi-autonomous vehicles,
with malicious intrusions identified as special cases. As the work of
Jacobi et al. suggests [30], information needs can change over time.
This certainly needs to be considered for the domain of cars in gen-
eral. However, we argue that (highly) critical situations are a special
case because they are rarely experienced. In order to establish a
practical relevance, we would like distinguish ourselves from the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework [47]. It focuses primarily on build-
ing and maintaining critical infrastructure and thus provides a set
of activities to achieve specific cybersecurity outcomes. However, it
is not tailored to achieve good computer-human communication.
7 LIMITATIONS
Our study has several limitations, some of which originate from
the study design, while others are intrinsic to the measures we
use to gather our data. First, we drew our sample from MTurk.
Hence, it is not representative of the population of American car
owners, since MTurk users are usually between 18 and 48 years
old and have some level of college education [50]. However, as we
were particularly interested in the specifics of malicious intrusions,
MTurk serves a suitable population for our purpose [50]. Second,
we confront participant with hypothetical scenarios. This means
that the participants have to imagine experiencing the described
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situation. Although we tried to make the scenarios as tangible as
possible, they cannot offer the same quality as a personal experi-
ence. Due to the hypothetical character of the study, participants
are relieved from any driving-related tasks. Additionally, at the
point in time of the scenarios, when we asked for the driver’s in-
formation demand, the car is not moving (anymore). Hence, the
“drivers” - in that sense - are no longer drivers as they are not
constrained by typical driving tasks when we elicited information
demands. Although participants reported demand for visual and
auditory alerts in response to a detected malfunction while driv-
ing, we acknowledge this general limitation to our scope of work.
Since only 13 participants reported having previous experiences in
driving or riding cars with autonomous driving features, this lack
of experience among participants likely biased our results as well.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that hypothetical surveys are able
to identify tendencies [5], which can be verified in future work. Yet,
we do not claim our results to be exhaustive, especially with regard
to the information types we elicited.
Third, as our study follows a mixed-methods approach, we have
to deal with a sample size trade-off. This means that it might be
necessary to recruit more participants in order to detect small
effects; however, this conflicts with qualitative data analysis. We
did power calculations to estimate our sample size for an estimated
medium effect between scenarios, resulting in 𝑁 = 60. Although we
usually reached saturation within the first round of coding, 𝑁 = 60
was still manageable in terms of qualitative evaluation.
8 CONCLUSION
We identified 18 information types ranging from situational aspects
to question types over car and warning specifics. Some of these
information types form a basic need for information across scenar-
ios. Depending on the perceived error cause, people may demand
more situational or car specific information. The findings could be
used to display relevant, sought-after information in appropriate
contexts and inform design decisions for human-car interaction.
Moreover, we found that malicious intrusions were consistently
perceived as critical, even if other perceived error sources in the
same scenario were not. Critical situations sparked increased infor-
mation demand, while at the same time making it hard to satisfy
people. However we believe that particularly these situations re-
quire our attention, since people need the best possible information,
especially in critical, potentially life-threatening scenarios.
Last but not least, we found the need to properly communicate
error sources. Participants did not identify malicious intrusions
in any scenario, unless being primed for it. If primed, they were
not able to assess the situation correctly and act accordingly. In
case of technical malfunction a similar effect surfaced in the crash
scenario were people were unsure of the Autopilots capabilities and
reasoning. We also found that simply prompting the error source
is not sufficient in highly critical situations as this solely places the
malfunction in the correct context leaving many open questions.
We argue that complete threat models cannot be expected from
drivers, and that the gaps we have identified must be taken into
account to support drivers when they need it most.
Our study is an important first step to improve in-car risk com-
munication to drivers and to provide helpful information at appro-
priate times. Depending on the situation this may build drivers’
confidence and trust in the safety and security of the car, while
it also may improve their decision-making capabilities in critical
situations. Future work could test and validate our results, e.g. in
providing drivers with relevant information and measuring how
they assess and react to different situations. If feasible, it would be
beneficial to test our results in a more realistic setting, though it
is not ethical to have participants experience highly critical situa-
tions first hand. More realistic study set-ups could also investigate
drivers’ information demand while being constrained with driving-
related tasks, which we did not cover. Last, but not least our insights
could be used to develop or enhance interface solutions for cars to
meaningfully communicate error sources in the future.
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A PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Table 3 contains an overview of the participants demographic split
by conditions.
TM MI NO Total
Gender
Women 7 9 7 23
Men 17 8 12 37
Age
Min 25 24 24 24
Max 73 59 69 73
Median 37 36 38 37
Mean 40.73 38.94 42.36 40.67
Education
Min 4 4 4 4
Max 21 13 17 21
Median 13 10 10 10
Mean 11.00 10.17 9.89 10.35
Driving Experience
Min 9 7 8 7
Max 48 44 52 52
Median 20 22 22 21
Mean 23.43 23.70 24.78 23.94
ATI Scale
Min 1.55 2 3.55 1.55
Max 6 6 5.88 6
Median 4.66 4.55 5 4.66
Mean 4.53 4.34 4.80 4.56
Table 3: Participant demographics. Education reported ac-
cording to OPM educational level [49]. Driving experience
in years. Affinity for technology interaction(ATI) scale [12]
results on a scale from 1-6. Higher values indicate a ten-
dency to actively participate in intensive technology inter-
action [62].
B CODEBOOKS
Table 4 shows an comparative overview of the six codebooks. Each
codebook contains high level codes about participants’ perceptions
of what happened in the scenario, feelings about the car’s response
to the scenario, reported next actions after the scenario, and infor-
mation demand in the scenario.
C RESULTS OF CORRESPONDENCE
ANALYSIS
We provide the contingency tables of the key (Table 5) and crash
(Table 8) scenario. Also we provide the results of the Correspon-
dence Analysis for both scenarios including chi-square distances
and relative inertias.
Investigating Car Drivers’ Information Demand after Safety and Security Critical Incidents CHI ’21, May 8–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan
Table 4: Comparative overview of the six codebooks. Mean inter-rater reliability of each codebook reported with Krippen-
dorff’s 𝛼 [35].
Key - NO
K’s 𝛼 : 0.842
Key - TM
K’s 𝛼 : 0.795
Key - MI
K’s 𝛼 : 0.815
Crash - NO
K’s 𝛼 : 0.906
Crash - TM
K’s 𝛼 : 0.771
Crash - MI
K’s 𝛼 : 0.819
Perceptions of what happened
Technical Malfunction Technical Malfunction Technical Malfunction Technical Malfunction Technical malfunction Technical Malfunction
Human Failure Human Failure Hack/ Intrusion Human Failure Human Failure Hack/ Intrusion
Security/ Safety Mechanism Correct Description Security/ Safety Mechanism Technical Limits Technical Limits Human Failure
Design of Car Incorrect Description Correct Description Correct Description Correct Description Minor Damage
Correct Description Incorrect Description Incorrect Description Incorrect Description Accident Avoided
Uncertainty
Feelings about car’s response to situation
Not Vehicle’s Fault Not Vehicle’s Fault Vehicle behaved appropriately Negative Feeling Negative Feeling Negative Feeling
Positive Feeling Positive Feeling Positive Feeling Surprised Feeling Safety Hazard Potentially lethal
Neutral Feeling Neutral Feeling Neutral Feeling Neutral Feeling Positive Feeling Neutral Feeling
Negative Feeling Negative Feeling Negative Feeling Positive Feeling Surprised Feeling Lost Trust
Safety Feeling Safety Feeling Safety Feeling Safety Hazard Worked properly General wariness of AI
Improvement is needed Car should react earlier Insecurity Feeling Driver should be attentive Need for Fallback Mechanism Need for Improvement
Improvement is needed Driver should be attentive
Next Actions
Key/ Battery Repair Key/ Battery Repair Key/ Lock Repair Continue with Autopilot Deactivate Autopilot Call Manufacturer
Supervise Car/ Key Use Key Analogously Contact Manufacturer/ Dealer Take over Manual Control Take over Manual Control Pull Over Car
Testing of Key Use 2nd Key of Car Contact Police Inspect Car Assess Car Damage Turn off Autopilot
Adaption of One’s Behaviour Continue with Actions Repair Get Professional Help Continue Driving Manually
Continue with Actions Take care not to repeat HF Report to Police Never Use Autopilot Again
Check Manual Don’t use Autopilot Report to Insurance Monitor Autopilot
No Action Report to Manufacturer Fix Accident Scene
Reflect on One’s Responsibility Call Police
Get Rid of Car Check Car for Damage
Understand Car Mechanics/Tech Get Car Towed
Never Drive this Car Again
Information Demand
Message/ Warning Message/ Warning Message/ Warning Status of Malfunctioning Parts Status of Malfunctioning Parts What happened
Why Status of Key What happened? Car’s Diagnostic Report Car’s Diagnostic Report Why it happened
Status of Key Action Recommendations Why did it happen? Why it happened Why it happened Who is attacker
No Information Demand Audio Reponse How was it possible? What happened What happened Preventative Meassures
Logs + Analytics Visual Response When did attack happen? Car’s Decision Process Preventative Measures Data for Fix
Usage Instructions No Information Demand Investigative Clues Car’s Parameters During Accident Car’s Parameters During Accident Message/ Warning
Action Recommendations Error Codes Warning/ Message Message/ Warning When it happened
Troubleshooting Status of Key Audio Warning Visual Warning Action Recommendations
Action Recommendations Visual Warning Audio Warning Damage Report





Table 5: Contingency table table of moderating factors and information demand codes of all conditions in the Key scenario.
What Why Who When How Status Report Decision Param Usage Prevent Message Trblshoot Recomm Visual Audio Before None
HiCrit 0 5 1 6 1 3 1 0 0 0 3 4 3 5 0 0 0 0
LessCrit 4 7 0 0 0 16 1 0 0 2 0 12 1 2 1 1 0 11
TM 2 5 0 0 0 12 1 0 0 1 0 7 0 2 1 0 0 5
MI 0 5 2 7 1 3 1 0 0 0 3 4 3 5 0 0 0 0
Human 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Design 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1
Threat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pos 1 2 2 6 1 7 0 0 0 1 1 6 4 5 0 0 0 3
Neg 2 8 0 4 0 10 1 0 0 0 2 6 3 5 0 0 0 0
Neut 2 5 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 8
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Table 6: Chi-Square Distances of moderating factors and information demand codes of all conditions in the Key scenario.
What Why Who When How Status Report Usage Prevent Message Trblshoot Recomm Visual Audio None Total
HiCrit 1,352 0,054 0,155 3,597 0,669 1,649 0,155 0,676 3,889 0,147 0,614 1,949 0,338 0,225 3,606 19,077
LessCrit 0,979 0,167 1,225 5,106 0,817 2,024 0,041 0,49 1,838 1,179 1,76 1,718 0,245 0,857 3,05 21,496
TM 0,151 0,001 0,761 3,169 0,507 3,626 0,075 0,075 1,141 0,44 2,155 0,357 1,01 0,254 0,22 13,942
MI 1,437 0,009 2,287 5,365 0,567 1,951 0,11 0,718 3,43 0,256 0,457 1,574 0,359 0,239 3,831 22,592
Human 0,338 3,114 0,169 0,704 0,113 1,549 0,169 4,086 0,254 1,211 0,479 0,676 0,085 0,056 10,651 23,654
Design 0,789 1,408 2,945 1,424 5,241 1,937 0,211 2,945 0,317 1,514 9,634 0,845 0,106 0,07 0,014 29,4
Pos 0,255 2,221 1,679 1,919 0,37 0,04 0,824 0,038 0,045 0,002 1,188 0,881 0,412 0,275 0,442 10,591
Neg 0,041 0,858 0,866 0,042 0,577 0,534 0,021 0,866 0,378 0,007 0,121 0,68 0,433 0,289 4,62 10,334
Neut 0,74 0,489 0,549 2,289 0,366 0,213 0,37 0,549 0,824 0,001 1,556 2,197 1,916 3,645 8,776 24,479
Total 6,082 8,322 10,636 23,615 9,227 13,524 1,977 10,443 12,116 4,758 17,965 10,878 4,903 5,91 35,21 175,565
Table 7: Relative inertias of moderating factors and information demand codes of all conditions in the Key scenario.
What Why Who When How Status Report Usage Prevent Message Trblshoot Recomm Visual Audio None Total
HiCrit 0,008 0 0,001 0,02 0,004 0,009 0,001 0,004 0,022 0,001 0,003 0,011 0,002 0,001 0,021 0,109
LessCrit 0,006 0,001 0,007 0,029 0,005 0,012 0 0,003 0,01 0,007 0,01 0,01 0,001 0,005 0,017 0,122
TM 0,001 0 0,004 0,018 0,003 0,021 0 0 0,006 0,003 0,012 0,002 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,079
MI 0,008 0 0,013 0,031 0,003 0,011 0,001 0,004 0,02 0,001 0,003 0,009 0,002 0,001 0,022 0,129
Human 0,002 0,018 0,001 0,004 0,001 0,009 0,001 0,023 0,001 0,007 0,003 0,004 0 0 0,061 0,135
Design 0,004 0,008 0,017 0,008 0,03 0,011 0,001 0,017 0,002 0,009 0,055 0,005 0,001 0 0 0,167
Pos 0,001 0,013 0,01 0,011 0,002 0 0,005 0 0 0 0,007 0,005 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,06
Neg 0 0,005 0,005 0 0,003 0,003 0 0,005 0,002 0 0,001 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,026 0,059
Neut 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,013 0,002 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,005 0 0,009 0,013 0,011 0,021 0,05 0,139
Total 0,035 0,047 0,061 0,135 0,053 0,077 0,011 0,059 0,069 0,027 0,102 0,062 0,028 0,034 0,201 1
Table 8: Contingency table of moderating factors and information demand codes of all conditions in the Crash scenario.
What Why Who When How Status Report Decision Param Usage Prevent Message Trblshoot Recomm Visual Audio Before None
HiCrit 21 21 1 2 3 10 8 2 3 1 5 22 3 3 3 4 18 2
LessCrit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TM 14 14 0 0 0 10 7 2 3 0 2 15 0 1 3 4 16 1
MI 7 7 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 2 0 0 1 1
Human 8 8 0 1 1 5 5 0 3 1 3 5 2 1 2 2 5 1
Design 4 4 0 0 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 0
Threat 4 4 0 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 2 7 0 0 1 1 8 1
Pos 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neg 19 19 1 2 3 8 6 1 2 0 5 21 2 3 3 4 17 2
Neut 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 0
Table 9: Chi-Square Distances of moderating factors and information demand codes of all conditions in the Crash scenario.
What Why Who When How Status Report Decision Param Usage Prevent Message Trblshoot Recomm Visual Audio Before None Total
HiCrit 0,002 0,002 0,062 0,018 0,007 0,076 0,012 0,018 0,112 0,444 0,038 0,071 0,007 0,007 0,042 0,039 0 0,003 0,962
TM 0,016 0,016 0,543 1,268 1,992 0,753 0,25 0,423 0,085 0,362 0,855 0,018 1,992 0,494 0,177 0,276 0,983 0,139 10,644
MI 0,312 0,312 2,916 4,56 6,325 2,976 2,268 0,496 0,992 0,142 1,536 0,019 6,325 1,911 0,921 1,205 3,094 0,331 36,642
Human 0,014 0,014 0,313 0,1 0,019 0,087 0,827 0,73 1,622 3,001 0,299 1,342 0,633 0,019 0,306 0,029 0,672 0,033 10,059
Design 0,039 0,039 0,136 0,317 0,498 2,316 0,21 0,317 0,211 0,091 0,003 0,726 0,498 0,506 0,288 0,069 0,404 0,362 7,03
Threat 0,658 0,658 0,224 0,524 0,038 0,234 0,154 0,433 0,002 0,15 0,117 0,172 0,823 0,823 0,001 0,058 1,561 0,269 6,9
Pos 0,217 0,217 0,024 0,055 0,087 1,355 0,252 16,2 0,11 0,016 0,165 0,63 0,087 0,087 0,102 0,134 0,543 0,063 20,342
Neg 0,009 0,009 0,132 0,086 0,077 0,316 0,276 0,241 0,482 0,465 0,003 0,314 0,121 0,077 0 0,001 0,059 0,011 2,68
Neut 0,006 0,006 0,071 0,165 0,26 0,992 0,079 0,165 1,355 0,047 0,496 0,006 2,108 0,26 0,307 0,892 0,084 0,189 7,49
Total 1,276 1,276 4,422 7,092 9,303 9,106 4,327 19,02 4,972 4,717 3,512 3,299 12,59 4,184 2,144 2,702 7,401 1,4 102,748
Table 10: Relative Inertias of moderating factors and information demand codes of all conditions in the Crash scenario.
What Why Who When How Status Report Decision Param Usage Prevent Message Trblshoot Recomm Visual Audio Before None Total
HiCrit 0 0 0,001 0 0 0,001 0 0 0,001 0,004 0 0,001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,009
TM 0 0 0,005 0,012 0,019 0,007 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,004 0,008 0 0,019 0,005 0,002 0,003 0,01 0,001 0,104
MI 0,003 0,003 0,028 0,044 0,062 0,029 0,022 0,005 0,01 0,001 0,015 0 0,062 0,019 0,009 0,012 0,03 0,003 0,357
Human 0 0 0,003 0,001 0 0,001 0,008 0,007 0,016 0,029 0,003 0,013 0,006 0 0,003 0 0,007 0 0,098
Design 0 0 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,023 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0 0,007 0,005 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,004 0,004 0,068
Threat 0,006 0,006 0,002 0,005 0 0,002 0,001 0,004 0 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,008 0,008 0 0,001 0,015 0,003 0,067
Pos 0,002 0,002 0 0,001 0,001 0,013 0,002 0,158 0,001 0 0,002 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,005 0,001 0,198
Neg 0 0 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,003 0,002 0,005 0,005 0 0,003 0,001 0,001 0 0 0,001 0 0,026
Neut 0 0 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,01 0,001 0,002 0,013 0 0,005 0 0,021 0,003 0,003 0,009 0,001 0,002 0,073
Total 0,012 0,012 0,043 0,069 0,091 0,089 0,042 0,185 0,048 0,046 0,034 0,032 0,123 0,041 0,021 0,026 0,072 0,014 1
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Figure 6: Key scenario
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Figure 7: Crash scenario
Figure 8: Balloon plot representation of the contingency table table of moderating factors and information demand codes.
Bigger dots indicate larger chi-square distances. Refer to tables 6 and 9 in the Appendix for exact results.
